ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber)

3 June 2026 (*)

( Action for annulment – Common foreign and security policy – National staff member seconded to EUPOL COPPS – Standard Operating Procedure concerning the Performance and Development Process – Form finalising a Performance Improvement Plan – Measure not open to challenge – Intermediate measure – Manifest inadmissibility )

In Case T-355/25,

DV, residing in [confidential], (1) represented by A. Pappas, lawyer,

applicant,

v

Council of the European Union, represented by M. Bauer, J. Rurarz and S. Lejeune, acting as Agents,

European External Action Service (EEAS), represented by R. Spáč and E. Orgován, acting as Agents,

and

European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS), represented by K. Limdal, in her capacity as Head of Mission, and by E. Raoult, lawyer,

defendants,

THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber),

composed of K. Kowalik-Bańczyk, President, R. da Silva Passos and T. Pavelin (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

makes the following

Order

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, [confidential], seeks the annulment of the form of 19 March 2025 completed by the Deputy Head of the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS), concluding the Performance Improvement Plan concerning the applicant (‘the contested act’).

Background to the dispute and facts subsequent to the contested act

2 The applicant was seconded by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to serve as Human Rights Adviser at EUPOL COPPS from 20 May 2024 to 19 May 2025.

3 On 20 November 2024, the applicant attended a meeting with her direct line manager at the time, namely the Deputy Head of EUPOL COPPS. During that meeting, the Deputy Head of EUPOL COPPS informed the applicant that a Performance Improvement Plan, within the meaning of point 5 of the EUPOL COPPS Standard Operating Procedure concerning the Performance and Development Process (‘the SOP’), was to be initiated on the basis of her underperformance.

4 On 21 November 2024, the applicant received an initial Performance Improvement Plan form concerning her. That document reported on the applicant’s conduct since the beginning of her secondment to EUPOL COPPS, and highlighted the aspects of her conduct which she had to improve.

5 After attending two follow-up meetings in connection with that plan, the applicant received, by email of 19 March 2025, the contested act. By that act, the Deputy Head of EUPOL COPPS terminated the applicant’s Performance Improvement Plan, not recommending to the Head of EUPOL COPPS the extension of the applicant’s secondment.

6 On 16 April 2025, the applicant was able to submit her observations on the contested act.

7 On 22 April 2025, the applicant received the non-extension form completed by the Deputy Head of EUPOL COPPS and then by the Head of EUPOL COPPS (‘the non-extension form’). First, that document reiterated the recommendation of the Deputy Head of EUPOL COPPS not to extend the applicant’s secondment. Second, it contained the decision of 18 April 2025 by which the Head of EUPOL COPPS had followed the recommendation of the Deputy Head of EUPOL COPPS and had not extended the applicant’s secondment.

Forms of order sought

8 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested act;

– order the Council of the European Union, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and EUPOL COPPS to pay the costs.

9 In separate documents lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 6 and 9 October 2025, respectively, and containing pleas of inadmissibility under Article 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the EEAS and the Council contend that the Court should:

– dismiss the action as inadmissible in so far as it is directed against them;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

10 EUPOL COPPS contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action as inadmissible;

– alternatively, dismiss the action as manifestly unfounded;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

11 In its observations on the pleas of inadmissibility lodged at the Court Registry on 22 January 2026, the applicant claims that the Court should:

– declare the action admissible at least in so far as it is directed against the Council, the EEAS or EUPOL COPPS;

– order, so far as concerns the pleas of inadmissibility, each party to bear its own costs.

Law

12 Under Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure, where an action is manifestly inadmissible, the Court may, on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur, at any time decide to give a decision by reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings.

13 In the present case, the Court considers that it has sufficient information available to it from the material in the file and has decided to give a decision without taking further steps in the proceedings.

14 As a preliminary point, in their pleas of inadmissibility, the EEAS and the Council submit that the action is inadmissible in so far as it is directed against them, since, first, they are not the authors of the contested act and, second, they were not involved in any way in the process for adopting that act, which cannot therefore be attributed to them.

15 Without formally raising a plea of inadmissibility, EUPOL COPPS contends, in its defence, principally, that the action is inadmissible.

16 In that regard, EUPOL COPPS contends, in particular, that the contested act is a recommendation which is essentially worded in non-imperative terms and is not intended to produce binding legal effects.

17 The applicant opposes the plea of inadmissibility raised by EUPOL COPPS. In her view, the contested act should be regarded as a challengeable act for the purposes of the first paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, as it produces adverse legal effects in relation to her, in the same way as an appraisal report for the purposes of Article 43 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’).

18 According to the applicant, the contested act contains, like an appraisal report, negative assessments concerning the performance of the applicant, capable of affecting her career, in particular by undermining her image with the seconding authority and by reducing her chances of being seconded at a later stage to another common security and defence policy mission.

19 According to settled case-law, the action for annulment established in Article 263 TFEU is available in the case of all measures adopted by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to have binding legal effects (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 July 2022, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, C-348/20 P, EU:C:2022:548, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited).

20 By contrast, any act not producing binding legal effects, such as preparatory acts, implementing measures, mere recommendations and opinions and, in principle, internal instructions, falls outside the scope of the judicial review provided for in Article 263 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 September 2006, Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission, C-131/03 P, EU:C:2006:541, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).

21 In order to determine whether an act produces such effects and may, accordingly, form the subject matter of an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU, it is necessary to examine the substance of that act and to assess those effects in the light of objective criteria, such as the content of that act, taking into account, as appropriate, the context in which it was adopted and the powers of the institution, body, office or agency which adopted the act (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 July 2022, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, C-348/20 P, EU:C:2022:548, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

22 That said, it should be borne in mind that, in the case of acts drawn up in several procedural stages, an act is, in principle, open to challenge only if it definitively determines the position of the competent EU institution, body, office or agency, to the exclusion of intermediate measures whose aim is to prepare that final measure and which produce no independent legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. Acts expressing a provisional opinion of that EU institution, body, office or agency in particular constitute such intermediate measures (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 November 1981, IBM v Commission, 60/81, EU:C:1981:264, paragraph 10; of 22 September 2022, IMG v Commission, C-619/20 P and C-620/20 P, EU:C:2022:722, paragraph 103; and of 18 June 2024, Commission v SRB, C-551/22 P, EU:C:2024:520, paragraph 92).

23 According to the case-law, an intermediate measure is not capable of forming, in particular, the subject matter of an action for annulment if it is established that the illegality attaching to that measure can be relied on in support of an action against the final decision for which it represents a preparatory step. In such circumstances, the action brought against the decision terminating the procedure will provide sufficient judicial protection (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 November 1981, IBM v Commission, 60/81, EU:C:1981:264, paragraph 12, and of 15 March 2017, Stichting Woonlinie and Others v Commission, C-414/15 P, EU:C:2017:215, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).

24 In the present case, in the first place, as regards the content of the contested act, it should be noted that that act mainly contains mere assessments by the Deputy Head of EUPOL COPPS pertaining to the applicant’s performance and conduct in EUPOL COPPS, and of her progress or lack of progress, in relation to the competences concerned.

25 Moreover, the conclusion of the contested act is worded in non-binding terms, in so far as the Deputy Head of EUPOL COPPS merely does not recommend that the Head of EUPOL COPPS should extend the applicant’s secondment. The same applies to the email of 19 March 2025 accompanying the contested act.

26 In the second place, as regards the context in which the contested act took effect, it should be noted that that act was adopted in a complex procedure occurring in several stages, involving the participation of several parties and aimed at adopting a final decision whether or not to extend the applicant’s secondment, as is clear from the SOP.

27 In that regard, a Performance Improvement Plan consists of, according to point 5.1 of the SOP, a written agreement between the line managers of a staff member of EUPOL COPPS and that staff member relating to the progressive development of that staff member’s performance, where it is judged to be unsatisfactory by the staff member’s line managers. The establishment of such a plan includes, at least, two follow-up meetings, each of which must be accompanied by a form describing the steps to be taken until the conclusion of the Performance Improvement Plan. The last of those forms, that is, in the present case, the contested act, enables that plan to be concluded.

28 However, it should be noted that, in accordance with point 6.4 of the SOP, the establishment of a Performance Improvement Plan in respect of a staff member of EUPOL COPPS is a necessary condition for the direct line manager of the staff member concerned to be able to recommend subsequently to the Head of EUPOL COPPS, where appropriate, the non-extension of that staff member’s secondment.

29 When such a recommendation has been sent to the Head of EUPOL COPPS, first, it is for that person to adopt, where appropriate, a decision not to extend the secondment of the EUPOL COPPS staff member concerned, by completing and signing the non-extension form, in accordance with point 6.5 of the SOP.

30 Second, according to points 7.1 to 7.3 of the SOP, any staff member of EUPOL COPPS whose secondment has not been extended by decision of the Head of EUPOL COPPS may bring an appeal against that decision before the Appeals Board, which must review the file of the EUPOL COPPS staff member concerned, hear the staff member concerned, and then issue a written recommendation to the Head of EUPOL COPPS on whether or not to extend that staff member’s secondment.

31 Third, under point 7.4 of the SOP, after receiving the Appeals Board’s recommendation, the Head of EUPOL COPPS takes the decision whether or not to extend the secondment of the EUPOL COPPS staff member concerned, confirming, or not, his or her first decision in that regard.

32 In the light of the various stages of that complex procedure set out in paragraphs 27 to 31 above, it is clear that the form concluding a Performance Improvement Plan initiated in respect of a staff member of EUPOL COPPS does not definitively settle the position of EUPOL COPPS on whether or not to extend the secondment in question. Therefore, such a form cannot, in itself, definitively affect the situation of a staff member of EUPOL COPPS (see, to that effect and by analogy, order of 16 November 2018, OT v Commission, T-552/16, not published, EU:T:2018:807, paragraph 57).

33 In the third place, as regards the powers of the author of the contested act, it is clear, in the light of the considerations contained in paragraphs 29 and 31 above, that the direct line manager of a staff member seconded to EUPOL COPPS does not have the power to take the final decision on whether or not to extend the secondment of that staff member to EUPOL COPPS (see, to that effect and by analogy, order of 1 June 2017, Camerin v Parliament, T-647/16, not published, EU:T:2017:373, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

34 Therefore, in the light of the content of the contested act, the legal context in which that act was adopted, and the powers devolved to the direct line manager of a staff member of EUPOL COPPS with regard to the extension, or not, of that staff member’s secondment, it must be concluded that the contested act is an intermediate measure, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 22 above, which is not intended to produce binding legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.

35 In that regard, contrary to what the applicant claims, a form concluding a Performance Improvement Plan of a staff member cannot be treated in the same way as an appraisal report for the purposes of Article 43 of the Staff Regulations.

36 Appraisal reports which, once final, are challengeable acts within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU are documents which are produced, in principle, each year of an official’s career, irrespective of any procedure other than an official’s regular appraisal procedure, for which they are the culmination.

37 However, as the General Court accepted in the judgment of 25 June 2020, XH v Commission (T-511/18, EU:T:2020:291, paragraph 134), which the applicant herself cites, the case-law recognising the challengeable nature of appraisal reports cannot be extended to cover documents which have as their sole purpose the preparation of a particular decision on the part of the administration, to which they are therefore closely linked.

38 A form concluding a Performance Improvement Plan concerning a staff member of EUPOL COPPS, such as the staff member at issue, is intended to prepare the final decision whether or not to extend that person’s secondment. That document is therefore closely linked to that decision. Unlike an appraisal report, a Performance Improvement Plan and, a fortiori, the various documents adopted in the course of implementing that plan are produced in EUPOL COPPS only if the performance of one of its staff members is judged to be unsatisfactory by his or her line managers, as is apparent from paragraph 27 above, with the result that the decision whether or not to extend that staff member’s secondment is a consequence inherent in the establishment of such a plan.

39 Accordingly, it must he held that the contested act is not a challengeable act for the purposes of the first paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.

40 In the light of all of the foregoing, the action must be dismissed as manifestly inadmissible, without it being necessary to rule on the pleas of inadmissibility raised, respectively, by the EEAS and the Council.

Costs

41 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

42 In the present case, since the applicant has been unsuccessful, she must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the forms of order sought by the defendants.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber)

hereby orders:

1. The action is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible.

2. DV shall pay the costs.

Luxembourg, 3 June 2026.

* Language of case: English.

1 Confidential information redacted.