JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)

3 June 2026 (*)

( Civil service – Officials – Retirement pensions – Weighting factor – Resettlement allowance – Decisions of the Swedish courts on the place of residence – Refusal to grant a certificate of residence – Recovery of overpayments – No need to adjudicate in part – Obligation to state reasons – Right to be heard – Duty to have regard for the welfare of officials – Liability )

In Case T-662/24,

GW, represented by L. Levi, lawyer,

applicant,

v

European Commission, represented by A. Sauka and A. Sipos, acting as Agents,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber),

composed of S.L. Kalėda, President, M. Jaeger and S. Verschuur (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: A. Audras-Hidelot, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 21 January 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By his action under Article 270 TFEU, the applicant, GW, seeks, first, annulment of the decision of the European Commission of 15 December 2023 informing him that he was not entitled to the resettlement allowance and the weighting factor for Sweden and confirming the recovery of the sums overpaid on that basis (‘the first contested decision’), of the Commission’s decision of 27 March 2024 which, in the first place, confirmed recovery of the sum concerned under Article 85 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’) by providing him with a repayment schedule and, in the second place, specified that suspension of the deductions was not provided for by the Staff Regulations (‘the second contested decision’), the Commission’s decision of 8 May 2024 confirming recovery of the sum under Article 85 of the Staff Regulations while amending the repayment schedule and specifying that suspension of the deductions was not provided for by the Staff Regulations (‘the third contested decision’) (taken together, ‘the contested decisions’) and the Commission’s decision of 14 October 2024 rejecting his complaints of 14 March and 23 May 2024 against the contested decisions (‘the decision rejecting the complaints’) and, second, compensation for the material and non-material damage which he claims to have suffered as a result of those decisions.

Background to the dispute

2 The applicant, a retired official with dual Swedish and German nationality, worked first for the Court of Justice of the European Union and subsequently for the Commission. During his years of service (from 1999 to 2019), he lived with his family in Belgium, before retiring on 1 September 2019.

3 Before the effective date of his retirement, the applicant informed the Commission’s ‘Office for the Administration and Payment of Individual Entitlements’ (PMO) of his intention to return to Sweden in order to settle there permanently after his retirement. However, he stated that he would regularly return to Belgium for stays of a few days in order to visit his wife.

4 On 3 July 2019, the PMO informed the applicant that, since his place of origin was Sweden (Jönköping), the weighting factor for that Member State would be applied to him, after receipt of the documents proving the establishment of his residence in accordance with Article 20(3) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations.

5 On 25 July 2019, the applicant informed the PMO that he would establish his residence in Sweden. The applicant submitted several supporting documents, which included his application to be registered in the Swedish population register, utility bills (electricity and planned internet installation), a home insurance invoice, an invoice for works executed on his property in Sweden, a notification from the local waste collection service concerning the installation of a refuse bin, and a declaration of residence bearing his electronic signature.

6 Additionally, the applicant informed the PMO that he intended to visit his wife in Belgium for three months each year. The applicant’s wife, who is a Swedish national and was an official of the Commission, resides in Waterloo (Belgium). She retired on 1 May 2023 but, after her retirement, maintained her residence in the property in Belgium of which the spouses were co-owners and did not resettle in Sweden.

7 On 5 November 2019, the Swedish tax authority, the authority responsible for managing the Swedish population register, rejected the applicant’s application submitted in August 2019 to be registered in the Swedish population register at the address of his property in Jönköping. That authority considered that the applicant had his actual place of residence outside Sweden, since he had stated that he would spend 120 days per year in Belgium, with the result that he could not be registered in Sweden.

8 On 12 November 2019, upon the applicant’s request, the Belgian authorities removed him from the population register of the municipality of Waterloo.

9 On 18 November 2019, after examining the documents submitted by the applicant on 25 July of the same year (see paragraph 5 above), the PMO applied the weighting factor for Sweden to his acquired pension rights. That weighting factor was paid to him retroactively as from 1 September 2019. From December 2019, that weighting factor, together with the resettlement allowance, was paid to the applicant on a monthly basis.

10 On 13 February 2020, the Förvaltningsrätten i Jönköping (Administrative Court, Jönköping, Sweden) delivered its judgment dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the tax authority’s decision of 5 November 2019 (see paragraph 7 above). That court based its decision on the ground that the applicant’s wife still lived in Belgium and that he had noted in his application to be registered in the Swedish population register that he planned to visit her for 120 days per year. That court also took note of the fact that the Belgian authorities had removed him from the population register, but decided that that fact was not relevant for assessing the applicant’s situation in Sweden.

11 On 10 March 2020, the applicant sent an email to the PMO informing it of his situation in Sweden and of the judgment of the Förvaltningsrätten i Jönköping (Administrative Court, Jönköping), to which neither the PMO nor the Commission replied.

12 On 9 December 2020, the Kammarrätten i Jönköping (Administrative Court of Appeal, Jönköping, Sweden) delivered its judgment following the appeal brought by the applicant against the judgment of the Förvaltningsrätten i Jönköping (Administrative Court, Jönköping). In particular, it held that, given that the applicant had two residences and that he would be visiting his wife in Belgium, it had not been proved that he was resident in Sweden. Furthermore, by rejecting his application for registration, the national authorities had not infringed Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ 2004 L 158, p. 77, and corrigenda OJ 2004 L 229, p. 35, and OJ 2005 L 197, p. 34), and that rejection could not, contrary to what the applicant claimed, constitute an obstacle to the free movement of persons or in any way infringe EU law.

13 On 27 January 2021, the Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen (Supreme Administrative Court, Sweden) dismissed the applicant’s appeal, with the result that the judgment of the Kammarrätten i Jönköping (Administrative Court of Appeal, Jönköping) became final.

14 On 5 February 2021, the applicant informed the PMO of the decision of the Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen (Supreme Administrative Court). Furthermore, the applicant stated that, due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the fact that he was not registered anywhere, he had had no choice but to re-register in Belgium in order to be able to be vaccinated against COVID-19.

15 On 2 March 2021, the applicant sent a further email to the PMO, in which he requested, inter alia, information on the status of his file, to which the PMO did not reply.

16 On 26 and 27 April 2021, the applicant sent two emails to the PMO in order to inform it of his re-registration in Belgium and to send it a copy of his Belgian identity card, to which the PMO did not reply.

17 On 26 October 2021, the applicant sent a further email to the PMO explaining his situation, to which the PMO did not reply.

18 On 19 February 2022, the PMO sent a letter to the applicant in which it was stated that, in the light of the refusal by the Swedish authorities to register him in the Swedish population register, it was necessary to recover the sums overpaid to him in respect of the weighting factor for Sweden as from 1 September 2019 and of the resettlement allowance.

19 On 28 March and 1 April 2022, the PMO sent the applicant further letters in which, pursuant to Article 85 of the Staff Regulations, it informed him of the amount payable by him and also provided him with a schedule for the repayment of the sums concerned, covering the period from May 2022 to February 2023.

20 On 6 April 2022, the applicant replied to those letters and expressed his refusal to repay those amounts.

21 From May 2022 onwards, the Commission started deducting EUR 1 390.02 per month from the applicant’s pension.

22 On 7 June 2022, the applicant lodged a complaint challenging those monthly deductions.

23 On 28 September 2022, the PMO sent another letter to the applicant, in which it explained that, as a result of the cancellation of the installation allowance, it had recalculated his pension and provided him with the new amount payable by him and a new repayment schedule pursuant to Article 85 of the Staff Regulations. On 30 September 2022, the applicant lodged a complaint against that decision.

24 On 10 October 2022, the Commission adopted a decision upholding the applicant’s complaint of 7 June 2022. In particular, the Commission decided that the execution of the recovery would be suspended and that the applicant should be heard before the PMO took a decision on the recovery of the amount paid in respect of the weighting factor for Sweden.

25 In November, the PMO reimbursed the applicant the amounts recovered.

26 On 16 December 2022, the PMO sent a letter to the applicant which cancelled and replaced the letter of 19 February 2022 and the letters of 28 March and 28 September 2022. In that letter, it was stated that, in view of the observations provided by the applicant in his complaint of 30 September 2022 (see paragraph 23 above), the applicant had not demonstrated his change of residence to Sweden, for the purposes of Article 20(3) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations and Article 6 of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations, with the result that the PMO intended to recover the amount paid in respect of the weighting factor and the resettlement allowance. In the same letter, the PMO also invited the applicant to submit his comments in that regard, which he did in a letter of 23 December 2022.

27 On 23 January 2023, the PMO adopted a decision confirming the recovery of the weighting factor and the resettlement allowance, despite the applicant’s observations. In that decision, the PMO stated that it had asked the applicant to provide it with a residence certificate, which the applicant had not produced, since the national courts had found, after examining the applicant’s file, that he could not be regarded as having established his residence in Sweden, but rather that his residence remained in Belgium. Furthermore, the PMO considered, as the Swedish authorities had done, that the fact that the applicant’s wife resided in Belgium was a decisive factor in reaching such a conclusion. In addition, it recalled that the evidence adduced by the applicant showed only that he had ties with his country of birth, which, however, did not demonstrate that he had established his residence in that country.

28 On 16 March 2023, the applicant lodged a complaint against the PMO’s decision of 23 January 2023.

29 On 6 October 2023, the Commission annulled that decision of 23 January 2023, while requesting the PMO to re-examine all the material in the file and to adopt a new decision.

30 On 15 December 2023, the PMO adopted the first contested decision, informing the applicant that he was not entitled to the resettlement allowance and the weighting factor for Sweden and confirming the recovery of the sums overpaid on that basis.

31 On 4 January 2024, the applicant requested the Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen (Supreme Administrative Court) to reconsider its decision of 27 January 2021 (see paragraph 13 above), alleging an inadequate statement of reasons and invoking the absence of a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union.

32 On 17 January 2024, the applicant sent a letter to the PMO in order to express his concerns regarding the reasons put forward by the PMO in the first contested decision, to adduce new evidence in support of his position and to request the suspension of the deductions.

33 On 14 March 2024, the applicant filed a complaint against the first contested decision.

34 On 27 March 2024, the PMO adopted the second contested decision, in which it, first, confirmed the recovery of the sum concerned under Article 85 of the Staff Regulations by providing the applicant with a repayment schedule and, second, informed him that the suspension of the deductions is not provided for by the Staff Regulations.

35 On 29 March 2024, the applicant sent an email to the PMO reminding it that he had initiated legal proceedings in Sweden and had lodged a complaint with the Commission requesting that it initiate infringement proceedings against Sweden, under Article 258 TFEU, on the ground that EU law had been infringed in that context. In addition, he highlighted that the implementation of that decision would seriously affect his financial situation and therefore again requested the PMO to suspend the recovery of the allegedly undue amounts. The applicant received from the Commission an acknowledgement of receipt of that email.

36 On 8 May 2024, the PMO adopted the third contested decision, by which it reconfirmed the recovery of the sum concerned under Article 85 of the Staff Regulations, while amending the repayment schedule, and informed the applicant that the suspension of the deductions was not provided for by the Staff Regulations.

37 On 10 May 2024, the applicant sent another email to the PMO informing it that he had brought a new action before the Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen (Supreme Administrative Court), to which the PMO did not reply.

38 On 23 May 2024, the applicant lodged a complaint against the second and third contested decisions.

39 On 28 and 29 May 2024, the applicant sent new emails to the PMO in which he recalled that the second and third contested decisions had serious consequences for his financial situation. In those emails, he also criticised the lack of consistency in the decision-making process.

40 On 30 August 2024, the Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen (Supreme Administrative Court) rejected the request for reconsideration made by the applicant on 4 January 2024 (see paragraph 31 above).

41 On 14 October 2024, the Commission adopted the decision rejecting the complaints lodged by the applicant on 14 March and 23 May 2024 (see paragraphs 33 and 38 above).

Forms of order sought

42 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested decisions;

– annul the decision rejecting the complaints;

– order the Commission to pay compensation for the material and non-material damage suffered by him;

– order the Commission to pay the costs.

43 The Commission contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action as unfounded;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

Law

Subject matter of the action

44 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, claims for annulment formally directed against a decision rejecting a complaint, where that decision has no independent content, have the effect of bringing before the Court the act against which the complaint was submitted (see judgment of 5 June 2019, Bernaldo de Quirós v Commission, T-273/18, not published, EU:T:2019:371, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).

45 However, an express decision rejecting a complaint may, in the light of its content, not be confirmatory of the measure contested by the applicant, in particular where the decision rejecting the complaint contains a re-examination of the applicant’s situation in the light of new elements of law or of fact, or where it changes or adds to the original decision. In such circumstances, the rejection of the complaint constitutes a measure subject to review by the judicature, which will take it into consideration when assessing the legality of the contested measure (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 October 2019, Colombani v EEAS, T-372/18, not published, EU:T:2019:734, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited, and of 8 July 2020, WH v EUIPO, T-138/19, not published, EU:T:2020:316, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

46 In the present case, it should be noted that, first, in the first contested decision, the Commission, in essence, concluded that the applicant was not entitled to the resettlement allowance or to the weighting factor for Sweden, in that he had failed to prove that he had established his residence in that country, with the result that the corresponding payments which had been made had to be recovered.

47 In that regard, in the decision rejecting the complaints, the Commission confirms that conclusion, but also adopts a position on several elements not contained in the first contested decision, such as the outcome of the administrative and judicial proceedings brought by the applicant in Sweden, its lack of competence to assess the compatibility of the relevant rules of Swedish law with EU law, the reference to the evidence adduced by the applicant in order to demonstrate that his residence was in fact in Sweden and its arguments on Article 85 of the Staff Regulations.

48 In those circumstances, it will be necessary to examine the claim for annulment of both the first contested decision and the decision rejecting the complaints in so far as it concerns the first contested decision.

49 Second, by the second and third contested decisions, the Commission confirmed the recovery of the sum concerned under Article 85 of the Staff Regulations by providing the applicant with a repayment schedule and informing him that the suspension of the deductions is not provided for by the Staff Regulations (see paragraph 1 above). However, the decision rejecting the complaints does not provide any further details concerning those decisions. In those circumstances, in so far as it concerns the second and third contested decisions, the decision rejecting the complaints is purely confirmatory.

50 It follows that the claim for annulment must be regarded as being directed, first, against the contested decisions and, second, in part against the decision rejecting the complaints.

The continuing existence of a legal interest in bringing proceedings in respect of the second and third contested decisions

51 It must be recalled that an action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person is admissible only in so far as that person has an interest in having the contested act annulled. Such an interest requires that the annulment of that act must be capable, in itself, of having legal consequences and that the action may therefore, through its outcome, procure an advantage to the party which brought it. The proof of such an interest, which is evaluated at the date on which the action is brought and which is an essential and fundamental prerequisite for any legal proceedings, must be adduced by the applicant (see judgment of 18 December 2024, TB v ENISA, T-560/21, EU:T:2024:914, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).

52 That interest must, in the light of the purpose of the action, exist at the stage of lodging the action, failing which the action will be inadmissible, and continue until the final decision, failing which there will be no need to adjudicate. The Court hearing the case may raise of its own motion and at any stage of the proceedings the objection that a party has no interest in maintaining his or her application, by reason of the occurrence of a fact subsequent to the date on which the document instituting the proceedings was lodged (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 December 2024, TB v ENISA, T-560/21, EU:T:2024:914, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).

53 In the present case, it should be recalled that, on 17 January and 29 March 2024, the applicant requested the suspension of the deductions from his pension. In response, in the second and third contested decisions, the Commission confirmed the recovery of the sum concerned under Article 85 of the Staff Regulations, providing the applicant with a repayment schedule and informing him that the suspension of the deductions is not provided for by the Staff Regulations. In those circumstances, by way of a measure of organisation of procedure, the Court invited the parties to set out their position on the applicant’s continuing legal interest in bringing proceedings in respect of those decisions, in so far as the last payment had been deducted from his pension in January 2025.

54 In response, at the hearing, the applicant left the matter to the Court’s discretion, stating that, if the first contested decision were annulled, there would therefore no longer be any legal basis for recovery. However, he has not adduced any evidence that he retains an interest in bringing proceedings in respect of the second and third contested decisions, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 51 above.

55 Therefore, in the absence of proof of such an interest, it must be concluded that there is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action in so far as it concerns the second and third contested decisions, which concern the requests for suspension made by the applicant.

The claim for annulment

56 In support of his action, the applicant raises three pleas in law, alleging, first, a manifest error of assessment and infringement by the Commission of Article 20(3) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations, Article 6 of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations and Article 85 of the Staff Regulations, second, breach by the Commission of the principle of the autonomous interpretation of EU law and, third, infringement by the Commission of the right to good administration and breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials.

57 In that context, it is appropriate to examine, in the first place, the first part of the third plea in law, alleging breach of the obligation to state reasons, in the second place, the first part of the first plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 6 of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations and Article 20(3) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations, and the second plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of the autonomous interpretation of EU law, in the third place, the second part of the first plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 85 of the Staff Regulations, and, in the fourth place, the second, third and fourth parts of the third plea in law, alleging breach of the duty to act within a reasonable time, breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials and infringement of the right to be heard.

The first part of the third plea in law, alleging breach of the obligation to state reasons

58 The applicant claims that the Commission did not address his arguments. In the applicant’s view, in the first contested decision, the Commission made no reference to the breach of the principle of the autonomous interpretation of EU law and neither in that decision nor in the decision rejecting the complaints did it explain why the evidence which he adduced was insufficient to demonstrate that he had the genuine intention of establishing his residence in Sweden and that he actually established that residence.

59 Accordingly, the Commission prevented the applicant from understanding the reasons why it decided to seek repayment of the sums allegedly overpaid and the Courts of the European Union from reviewing the legality of the first contested decision.

60 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

61 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that the obligation on the administration to give reasons for its decisions, enshrined in Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and Article 296 TFEU, is an essential procedural requirement, as distinct from the question whether the reasons given are correct, which goes to the substantive legality of the contested measure (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 May 2012, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission, T-300/10, EU:T:2012:247, paragraph 180 and the case-law cited).

62 As regards the extent of the obligation to state reasons, although the statement of reasons must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the administration, it must be assessed on the basis of the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressee may have in obtaining explanations. Furthermore, it is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must be assessed with regard not only to its wording, but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, to that effect, judgments of 30 November 2006, J v Commission, T-379/04, EU:T:2006:368, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited, and of 29 April 2020, CV and Others v Commission, T-496/19, not published, EU:T:2020:163, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

63 In that context, it should be noted that, in the first contested decision, the Commission’s conclusion that, in essence, the applicant had not transferred his residence to Sweden is based primarily on the refusal by the Swedish authorities to recognise the applicant as a resident, but also on the maintenance of family ties with Belgium, where his wife still resided.

64 Furthermore, in the decision rejecting the complaints, the Commission recalls the definition of the concept of ‘habitual residence’, within the meaning of the Staff Regulations, and the fact that, in applying that concept, all the factual elements must be taken into account, while referring to the autonomous nature of that concept in the context of the Staff Regulations.

65 In addition, in the decision rejecting the complaints, the Commission explains that, in the context of assessing a request for the grant of the resettlement allowance, the PMO accepts a certificate of residence in the new place as credible proof of the residence of the official concerned. Thus, it would be reasonable for the PMO to request, first, proof of removal from the previous population register and, second, proof of registration in the population register of that official’s new place of residence.

66 Next, in the decision rejecting the complaints, the Commission summarises the outcome of the administrative and judicial proceedings in Sweden, in which it was concluded that the applicant had two residences, but that his principal residence was in Belgium, where he had the most important ties, and not in Sweden. In that regard, the Commission submits that, since April 2021, the applicant has resided continuously in Belgium, in the property that he co-owns in Waterloo, where his wife, who is also a Swedish national, has also remained since her retirement in May 2023. In addition, reference is also made to the lack of conclusive and consistent evidence adduced by the applicant, which, under Swedish law, resulted in the rejection of his registration in the population register.

67 The Commission concludes that, inasmuch as it is not competent to assess the compatibility of Swedish law with EU law, it could not have ignored the conclusions reached by the Swedish authorities, even though the examination of the evidence adduced by the applicant did not allow it to call those conclusions into question.

68 It is necessary to examine, in turn, the two arguments which, according to the applicant, the Commission did not address, namely those concerning the breach of the principle of the autonomous interpretation of EU law and the evidence which he adduced in order to demonstrate his residence in Sweden.

69 In the present case, as regards, first, the alleged breach of the principle of the autonomous interpretation of EU law, it should be noted that that aspect is addressed in the decision rejecting the complaints (see paragraph 64 above).

70 Similarly, as regards the evidence adduced by the applicant, it should be noted that, in the first contested decision, no reference is made to it by the Commission, whereas, in the decision rejecting the complaints, the Commission also provides a response to it (see paragraph 67 above).

71 In addition, it should be noted that the first contested decision and the decision rejecting the complaints were adopted in a context known to the applicant, which enabled him to understand the Commission’s assessment of that evidence and the Court to exercise its power of review, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 62 above.

72 Indeed, it is apparent from the decision of 23 January 2023 that the Commission considered, in essence, that even though the evidence which the applicant had already adduced in his observations of 23 December 2022 (see paragraphs 26 and 27 above) confirmed his ties with his country of birth, that is, Sweden, those ties were not sufficient to establish his residence in that country.

73 In that regard, at the hearing, the Commission explained that the evidence adduced by the applicant demonstrated that he did, in fact, reside in Sweden, without, however, establishing to the requisite legal standard that his property in Sweden was his principal residence. Such a case of dual residence is not provided for by the Staff Regulations.

74 Therefore, in the light of those explanations, it must be held that the applicant was put in a position to understand the reasons why the evidence he had adduced did not enable the Commission to establish that he had his residence in Sweden, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 62 above.

75 It follows that the first part of the third plea in law must be rejected.

The first part of the first plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 6 of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations and Article 20(3) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations and the second plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of the autonomous interpretation of EU law

– The first part of the first plea in law alleging infringement of Article 6 of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations and Article 20(3) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations

76 The applicant claims that the Commission committed a manifest error of assessment and infringed the rules applicable to the resettlement allowance and the weighting factor.

77 In the first place, he submits that, according to settled case-law, registration in the national population register is not a decisive factor in proving a change of residence, within the meaning of Article 6 of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations, and that other factors may – and must – be taken into consideration. Thus, according to the applicant, the Commission wrongly attaches excessive importance to the certificate of residence.

78 In the second place, the applicant adduced several items of evidence demonstrating that he clearly intended to establish his residence in Sweden from July 2019 to March 2021. That evidence included, in particular, various documents, such as his application for registration in the Swedish population register, utility bills, a home insurance invoice, an invoice for works executed on his property in Sweden, an invoice for furniture purchased for that property, a notification from the local waste collection service concerning the installation of a refuse bin, a document certifying the registration of his car in Sweden, a medical certificate from his doctor in Sweden and a declaration of residence bearing his electronic signature. In addition, he paid taxes and subscriptions during his stay in Sweden. Lastly, he opened a Swedish bank account and brought multiple actions against the decision of the Swedish tax authorities refusing to register him in the Swedish population register.

79 In the third place, the fact that his wife was still living in Belgium during the reference period (from July 2019 to March 2021) and that he visited her several times a year is not sufficient to demonstrate that he had not changed his residence or that he did not genuinely intend to reside in Sweden, as the Commission appears to claim in the decision rejecting the complaints. From the outset, he was very transparent with the PMO and clearly stated that he intended to visit his wife in Belgium only a few times during the year, which is what he actually did.

80 In that regard, the applicant states that he lived alone in Sweden most of the time, as shown by the evidence, which, moreover, the Commission does not dispute. Therefore, the only tie he had with Belgium was his relationship with his wife. However, according to settled case-law, the existence of ‘family ties’ is not a condition that has to be met in order to establish the residence of an official.

81 Finally, on account of the unlawful conduct of Sweden, the COVID-19 pandemic and the dispute with the Commission, the applicant had no other choice than to resettle in Belgium in March 2021 and to continue residing there. Those reasons explain why his wife did not wish to reside in Sweden, since they both feared that they would face the same problems when trying to register there again.

82 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

83 As a preliminary point, it is apparent from Article 6(1) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations that, ‘an established official who provides evidence of a change of residence shall be entitled on termination of service to a resettlement allowance’. Furthermore, Article 20(3) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations provides that ‘for officials recruited before 1 May 2004, … their pensions shall be subject to the correction coefficient only if the residence of the official coincides with their last place of employment or with the country of their place of origin within the meaning of Article 7(4) of Annex VII’.

84 In that context, it should be recalled, first of all, that the concept of ‘residence’ is specific to the European civil service and does not necessarily coincide with the meanings attributed to that term under national law (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 June 2003, Del Vaglio v Commission, T-124/01 and T-320/01, EU:T:2003:153, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).

85 According to settled case-law, the concept of ‘residence’ within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations and Article 20 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations refers to the place where the interested party has established and intends to maintain the permanent or habitual centre of his or her interests (see, to that effect, judgments of 24 April 2001, Miranda v Commission, T-37/99, EU:T:2001:122, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited, and of 4 May 2010, Petrilli v Commission, F-100/08, EU:F:2010:35, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited), and implies, irrespective of the purely quantitative element of the time spent by the person concerned in a particular country, not only the actual fact of living in a given place, but also the intention of thereby achieving the continuity which stems from a stable way of life and from the course of normal social relations (see judgment of 25 May 2004, W v Parliament, T-69/03, EU:T:2004:155, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

86 The assessment of the installation or transfer of residence is a question of fact requiring the taking into account of the actual place of residence of the official (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 September 2005, Thommes v Commission, T-195/03, EU:T:2005:344, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited). Accordingly, it is for the official to establish, by any legal means, that he or she has, in fact, changed his or her place of residence within three years of termination of his or her service (see judgment of 25 May 2004, W v Parliament, T-69/03, EU:T:2004:155, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited). In addition, it is for the official to provide evidence of his or her actual resettlement with his or her family (judgment of 8 July 2003, Chetaud v Parliament, T-65/02, EU:T:2003:190, paragraph 64).

87 In that context, in assessing the evidence adduced and, where appropriate, carrying out checks, the institution must avoid any abuse of that provision (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 November 2013, Cortivo v Parliament, F-52/12, EU:F:2013:173, paragraph 42).

88 Accordingly, the transfer of residence referred to in Article 6 of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations necessarily implies an actual transfer of the residence of the official to the new place indicated as being the place of resettlement (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 April 2001, Miranda v Commission, T-37/99, EU:T:2001:122, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

89 In the present case, in the first place, it should be noted, as the applicant rightly submits, that, in the first contested decision and in the decision rejecting the complaints, the Commission relies principally on the fact that the Swedish national authorities refused to grant him a certificate of residence in order to conclude that he was not resident in Sweden.

90 In that regard, it is settled case-law that registration in a locality is a purely formal element which does not prove that the person concerned is actually resident in that locality (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 May 2023, AL v Commission, T-714/21, not published, EU:T:2023:282, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited). Accordingly, the fact of having a certificate of residence or of registration of residence with the municipal authority, of being enrolled on the electoral register of the relevant municipality, and of exercising political rights and paying taxes there is not sufficient to establish that the permanent centre of the official’s interests is located in that place (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2005, Herrero Romeu v Commission, T-298/02, EU:T:2005:369, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited, and of 25 October 2005, De Bustamante Tello v Council, T-368/03, EU:T:2005:372, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited).

91 However, it should be noted that the case-law cited in paragraph 90 above relates only to situations in which a certificate has been issued by the national authorities and not, as in the present case, to situations in which no such certificate has been issued.

92 In that context, it should be recalled that, before his retirement, the applicant informed the PMO that he intended to return to Sweden in order to settle there definitively after his retirement. In response, the PMO sent a note to the applicant on 3 July 2019, in which it informed him that the weighting factor applied to his pension would be determined once the documents proving his place of residence had been sent within the meaning of Article 20(3) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations, including, inter alia, the production of a recent certificate of residence. In response, on 25 July 2019, the applicant provided several items of evidence, including a request for registration in the Swedish population register, which, after examination by the PMO, were considered sufficient to consider him as registered in Sweden, subject to the production of a certificate of residence. However, it is clear that, during the administrative procedure, the applicant did not produce such a certificate issued by the Swedish authorities. In addition, the PMO also stated that ‘it reserves the right to amend or revise the above entitlements at any time in the case of error or omission of any kind if the award was contrary to the provisions of the Staff Regulations and Annex VIII thereto’.

93 In those circumstances, it is understandable that, without such a certificate having been issued by the Swedish national authorities, the Commission questioned the genuineness of the applicant’s resettlement in Sweden. Although a certificate of residence is only a purely formal element, the fact remains that it plays an important role in the assessment under Article 6 of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations and Article 20(3) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations, and that it reflects the position of the national authorities on whether the applicant’s residence in Sweden is genuine. In any event, having regard to the case-law cited in paragraph 86 above, it is clear that the applicant did not produce such a certificate, even though he had been expressly requested to do so by the Commission and had also been informed of the conditional nature of his rights.

94 In the second place, the applicant claims that the Commission disregarded the evidence which he had adduced to prove that his resettlement in Sweden was genuine and relied solely on the decisions of the Swedish national authorities.

95 In that regard, it is apparent from the decision rejecting the complaints that, according to the Commission, the evidence adduced by the applicant was not sufficient to dispel the doubts as to the genuineness of his resettlement in Sweden, raised by the Swedish national authorities, which had considered that the applicant’s residence had not been transferred to Sweden at the time of his application for registration in July 2019.

96 In that context, it should be recalled that Article 6(1) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations and Article 20(3) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations provide, in essence, that it is for the official to prove that he or she has established his or her residence in the country concerned. Accordingly, it is necessary to examine whether the Commission was right to consider that such evidence had not been adduced by the applicant.

97 In the present case, it should be noted that the applicant states that he has a property in Belgium, which he co-owns with his wife, and also a property in Sweden.

98 The fact that an official or other member of staff has real property in a country, in particular his or her country of origin, cannot suffice to show that he or she lived there permanently or habitually, or that he or she intended to settle in that country (judgment of 7 September 2022, LR v EIB, T-529/20, EU:T:2022:523, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

99 Thus, the fact that an official or other member of staff is a tenant or owner of his or her dwelling in a country – a fact which comes within the scope of the freedom to organise his or her personal and family life – cannot, in itself, establish whether or not that person has established the permanent or habitual centre of his or her interests in that country (see judgment of 7 September 2022, LR v EIB, T-529/20, EU:T:2022:523, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

100 Accordingly, in so far as the ownership of such property in Sweden is not sufficient to establish that the applicant had actually established his residence there within the meaning of Article 6 of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations and Article 20(3) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations, the Commission was right to examine whether the evidence which he had adduced, considered as a whole, was sufficient for that purpose.

101 In that context, it is apparent from the file that, on 25 July 2019, at the time of his retirement, the applicant provided the PMO with various supporting documents, including his application for registration in the Swedish population register, utility bills, a home insurance invoice, an invoice for works executed on his property in Sweden, a notification from the local waste collection service concerning the installation of a refuse bin and a declaration of residence bearing his electronic signature. It is common ground between the parties that, on the basis of those documents, the applicant was initially granted the resettlement allowance and the weighting factor for Sweden.

102 Subsequently, in order to demonstrate that his residence was in fact in Sweden during the reference period (from July 2019 to March 2021), the applicant produced a document certifying the registration of his car in Sweden, an invoice relating to the installation of internet in his property in Sweden, a medical certificate from his doctor in Sweden, an invoice for furniture purchased for that residence and several invoices relating to his daily consumption in Sweden.

103 In that regard, in so far as concerns the various invoices relating to his property in Sweden, it should be noted that they do not demonstrate that the applicant established the principal centre of his interests in Sweden. Although they highlight that the applicant genuinely owns property in Sweden and spent a significant amount of time there, they show, at most, as the Commission rightly submits, that he had a dual residence, namely a principal residence in Belgium and a secondary residence in Sweden.

104 It should be noted in that regard that neither Article 6 of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations nor Article 20 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations provides for the grant of the resettlement allowance and the application of the weighting factor in such a case of dual residence (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 May 2004, W v Parliament, T-69/03, EU:T:2004:155, paragraph 48, and of 7 November 2013, Cortivo v Parliament, F-52/12, EU:F:2013:173, paragraph 39).

105 Similarly, as for the other ties with Sweden relied on by the applicant, such as the registration of a car, medical consultations and the fact of being tax resident there and having financial interests and assets there, such as a bank account, it should be recalled that, according to the case-law, such ties which an official has with his or her country are insufficient to establish that he or she is resident in that country (see, to that effect, order of 26 September 2007, Salvador Roldán v Commission, F-129/06, EU:F:2007:166, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).

106 It follows that the Commission did not make an error of assessment in concluding, in the decision rejecting the complaints, that the evidence adduced by the applicant was not sufficient to demonstrate that he had established his residence in Sweden.

107 That conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicant’s claim that the multiple proceedings which he brought against the decision of the Swedish authorities refusing to register him in the population register demonstrate his intention to reside permanently in Sweden. Even if that fact were to reflect an intention on the part of the applicant to settle in Sweden, it would not be sufficient to prove that he had in fact transferred his residence to Sweden, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 88 above.

108 In the third place, as regards the Commission’s argument in the first contested decision that the applicant did not have his residence in Sweden in so far as he maintained significant family ties in Belgium, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law (see paragraph 86 above), the existence of such ties in a given country plays an essential role in determining whether a transfer of residence is genuine. It is for the official to provide evidence of his or her actual resettlement with his or her family.

109 In the present case, it is common ground between the parties that, in July 2019 (see paragraph 6 above), the applicant informed the PMO that he intended to visit his wife several times each year at their family property in Belgium.

110 Although, when the applicant retired in 2019, his wife was still working as an official for the Commission and it was therefore not possible for her to resettle in Sweden during that period, it is clear that, following her retirement in May 2023, she continued to reside in the couple’s property in Belgium, as the applicant moreover confirmed at the hearing.

111 Accordingly, the fact that his wife did not move to Sweden confirms that the applicant did not establish in that place the continuity which stems from a stable way of life and from the course of normal social relations, with the result that the permanent or habitual centre of his interests, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 85 above, was not transferred to Sweden, but remained in Belgium.

112 It follows that the Commission did not make an error of assessment in taking into account, in the first contested decision and in the decision rejecting the complaints, the situation of the applicant’s wife in order to conclude that the applicant had not established his residence in Sweden.

113 That conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicant’s general assertions that the allegedly unlawful conduct of Sweden, the COVID-19 pandemic and the dispute with the Commission explained why his wife did not wish to reside in Sweden, since both feared that they would face the same problems when trying to register in that country again. There is nothing to prove that his wife, who herself is a Swedish national, would also have been refused registration in the Swedish population register, particularly if she had submitted such an application for registration together with the applicant. Furthermore, those alleged difficulties likewise do not call into question the applicant’s obligation to prove the genuine nature of his resettlement in Sweden alongside his wife, within the meaning of Article 6 of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations.

114 In the light of the foregoing, the first part of the first plea must be rejected.

– The second plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of the autonomous interpretation of EU law

115 The applicant claims that the Commission acted in breach of the principle of the autonomous interpretation of EU law, in that, in the first contested decision and the decision rejecting the complaints, the Commission relies on decisions issued by Swedish authorities and courts in breach of national law and, above all, of EU law.

116 In that regard, in the first place, the applicant submits that, even though the Commission acknowledges that the concept of ‘residence’ within the meaning of the Staff Regulations is autonomous of the equivalent concept enshrined in national law or Directive 2004/38, it nevertheless relied on the decisions of the Swedish authorities and courts in order to argue that he should not have received the resettlement allowance or the weighting factor.

117 In addition, the applicant submits that the Commission cannot rely on the principle of sincere cooperation in order to circumvent its obligation to interpret, autonomously, the concept of ‘residence’ in the light of the provisions of the Staff Regulations.

118 In the second place, by referring to the position of the Swedish authorities in order to justify its decisions, the Commission endorses two infringements of EU law, namely, first, infringement of Directive 2004/38 and breach of the principle of the free movement of persons and, second, infringement of Article 267 TFEU.

119 The applicant duly informed the Commission that he had sent a complaint to the Commission’s Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, in which he stated that Sweden had failed to fulfil its obligations under EU law, of which the Commission was, in any event, aware, since other Swedish citizens had also encountered the same difficulties as the applicant.

120 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

121 In that regard, it should be recalled that, even though the Commission, in the first contested decision and in the decision rejecting the complaints, based its analysis largely on the findings of the Swedish authorities and courts, it also took account of other elements, in particular those put forward by the applicant, and of the fact that he had maintained family ties in Belgium (see paragraphs 63 to 66 above).

122 Accordingly, the applicant cannot argue that the Commission interpreted the concept of ‘residence’ solely by following the interpretation which the national courts have given to that concept under Swedish law, rather than also in the light of that provided for in the Staff Regulations.

123 In that context, it should be noted, first, that the applicant was not able to adduce evidence, either in his written pleadings or at the hearing, in order to explain how the Commission’s interpretation of the concept of ‘residence’ within the meaning of the Staff Regulations is incorrect and differs from its equivalent in Swedish law and, second, that there was nothing to prevent the Commission from referring to the findings of fact made by the Swedish national courts, in so far as, as it rightly submits, it was not in a position to conduct its own physical investigation as to the applicant’s actual residence, apart from the evidence adduced by the applicant.

124 Furthermore, as regards the argument based on the alleged unlawfulness of the decisions delivered by the Swedish authorities and courts and on the fact that he had lodged a complaint in that regard with the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, it should be noted that the applicant merely asserts, in his written pleadings, that those decisions infringed Directive 2004/38 and Article 267 TFEU, without specifying which provisions of that directive were infringed in the present case and on what basis an infringement of Article 267 TFEU should be found.

125 In those circumstances, the Commission was right to find that it was not for the Commission, in the present case, to interpret the Swedish legislation in the light of Directive 2004/38.

126 In the light of the above, the second plea in law should be rejected.

The second part of the first plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 85 of the Staff Regulations

127 The applicant claims that the Commission was not entitled to recover the amounts which he had received for the resettlement allowance and the weighting factor for Sweden. The conditions laid down in the first paragraph of Article 85 of the Staff Regulations were not satisfied, since the alleged unlawfulness of the payments is not, according to the applicant, obvious, even for an official with his level of responsibility and training.

128 In the first place, the PMO raised no objection when the applicant informed it of his intention not only to establish his residence in Sweden, but also to travel to Belgium occasionally in order to visit his wife. On that basis, the PMO paid him the resettlement allowance and the weighting factor for Sweden and changed its position only after the applicant’s action had been dismissed by the Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen (Supreme Administrative Court), thus rendering final the refusal by the Swedish authorities to register the applicant in the population register.

129 In the second place, the various Commission departments did not take the same position, or adopt the same analysis, as to whether the payments were undue. In that regard, despite the applicant’s transparency and good faith, the resettlement allowance and the weighting factor for Sweden continued to be paid to him, even after his return to Belgium in April 2021, when those payments were no longer justified.

130 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

131 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the first paragraph of Article 85 of the Staff Regulations authorises the institutions to recover, under certain conditions, sums overpaid to a member of their staff.

132 More specifically, the Court recalls that the recovery of overpayments under Article 85 of the Staff Regulations presupposes an overpayment of which the recipient was aware or whose erroneous nature was patently such that he or she could not have been unaware of it. In order to justify recovery of the sums overpaid, it is therefore sufficient that one of the two conditions required by Article 85 of the Staff Regulations be satisfied.

133 In that context, it should be noted that, according to the case-law, such an error in payment may result from either a failure to act or administrative tolerance and may relate to a lengthy period (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 July 2004, Gouvras v Commission, T-180/02 and T-113/03, EU:T:2004:238, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited).

134 As regards the first of the two conditions laid down for the recovery of the sums overpaid, it is for the administration to prove that the recipient was actually aware that there was no due reason for the payment (judgment of 24 February 1994, Stahlschmidt v Parliament, T-38/93, EU:T:1994:23, paragraph 18).

135 As regards the second condition, where overpayment is disputed by the recipient and in the absence of evidence that he or she was aware that there was no due reason for the payment, the circumstances in which the payment was made must be examined in order to determine whether the overpayment was patently evident (see judgment of 29 September 2005, Thommes v Commission, T-195/03, EU:T:2005:344, paragraph 116 and the case-law cited).

136 Thus, the words ‘patently such’ in Article 85 of the Staff Regulations do not mean that the official in receipt of an undue payment does not need to make any effort to reflect or check, but that repayment is required where the error is one which would not escape the notice of an official exercising ordinary care. In that regard, account must be taken, in each case, of the ability of the official concerned to make the necessary checks (see, to that effect, judgments of 24 February 1994, Stahlschmidt v Parliament, T-38/93, EU:T:1994:23, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited, and of 29 September 2005, Thommes v Commission, T-195/03, EU:T:2005:344, paragraph 123 and the case-law cited).

137 In the present case, the irregularity consists in the fact that there was no basis for the payment of the resettlement allowance and the weighting factor for Sweden, in that the applicant had not proved his residence in that country within the meaning of Article 6 of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations and Article 20(3) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations.

138 Furthermore, since the Commission has not established that the recipient was actually aware of there being no due reason for the payment, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 134 above, the second condition laid down for the recovery of overpayments within the meaning of Article 85 of the Staff Regulations is the only relevant condition in the present case.

139 Accordingly, it is necessary to examine whether, in the circumstances of the present case, the overpayment received by the applicant was ‘patently such’ that an official exercising ordinary care could not have been unaware of it.

140 In that regard, the Commission stated, in the decision rejecting the complaints, that, throughout the procedure, the PMO had consistently challenged the entitlement to the allowance, at least since its letter of 19 February 2022, in which it was clearly stated that the payment was undue. Furthermore, in view of the fact that the applicant was an official who had worked for 25 years in the European civil service, he should have known, according to the Commission, that, by failing to provide the documents requested and in the absence of conclusive evidence of an actual change of residence, there was no due reason for the payment which he received within the meaning of Article 85 of the Staff Regulations.

141 Thus, in the first place, it is necessary to reject the applicant’s argument that the PMO did not raise any objection when he informed it of his intention to establish his residence in Sweden, that it accordingly paid the resettlement allowance and the weighting factor for Sweden and that it was only when the Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen (Supreme Administrative Court) had decided to dismiss his appeal that the PMO changed its position.

142 As the Commission is right in arguing, the PMO’s decision of 18 November 2019 already mentioned the conditional nature of the applicant’s rights to the resettlement allowance and the weighting factor for Sweden and the need for him to provide a certificate of residence in good time.

143 In the second place, it is also necessary to reject the applicant’s argument that the fact that the various Commission departments did not take the same position on the issue of whether the payments were undue confirms that his situation was far from obvious to him, despite his level of responsibility and training and his length of service. In that context, the General Court has already ruled that the issue was not whether or not the error was obvious to the administration, but whether it was obvious to the person concerned. The situation of the administration, which is responsible for the payment of thousands of salaries and allowances of all kinds to its officials and other staff, cannot be compared to that of the official, who has a personal interest in checking the payments made to him every month (see judgment of 29 September 2005, Thommes v Commission, T-195/03, EU:T:2005:344, paragraph 121 and the case-law cited).

144 In the present case, having regard, in particular, to the steps taken by the applicant in order to inform the Commission of his situation in Sweden, which show that he had understood that the outcome of the procedure which he had initiated in Sweden to challenge the refusal to register him in the population register would play an important role in the possible grant of the resettlement allowance and the weighting factor for that country, he could not have been unaware of the overpayment in question.

145 In those circumstances, it must be concluded that the second condition laid down in Article 85 of the Staff Regulations for the recovery of sums overpaid is satisfied in the present case, with the result that the Commission was justified in recovering those sums.

146 Accordingly, the second part of the first plea in law must be rejected.

The second, third and fourth parts of the third plea in law, alleging breach of the duty to act within a reasonable time, breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials and infringement of the right to be heard

– The second part of the third plea in law, alleging breach of the duty to act within a reasonable time

147 The applicant submits that the Commission failed to respect his right to have his affairs handled within a reasonable time, as derives from settled case-law.

148 In that regard, the applicant submits that more than two years have elapsed since the beginning of the dispute in February 2022, and that his situation has still not been definitively resolved, with the result that the time limit for dealing with his case appears unreasonable and cannot, in any event, be justified by the Commission. The applicant has already submitted a first complaint against two contested decisions of 2022 and 2023, which were ultimately annulled in October 2023 by the Commission.

149 In that context, the applicant claims that, despite the numerous exchanges between the parties and the decision annulling the first contested decisions of 2022 and 2023, the Commission, by the first contested decision and by the decision rejecting the complaints, decided to maintain its position, notwithstanding the disagreement between the various Commission departments, leaving him with no choice but to challenge those new contested decisions by submitting new complaints.

150 Lastly, the Commission failed to comply with the four-month time limit for replying to his complaint against the first contested decision. Although the Commission replied to the complaint shortly before the expiry of the three-month time limit, extended on account of distance by 10 days to bring the action, it failed to explain, in the rejection decision, the reasons for the particularly long time taken to respond to that complaint.

151 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

152 In that regard, it should be recalled that compliance with the reasonable time requirement in the conduct of administrative procedures constitutes a general principle of EU law, the observance of which is ensured by the EU judicature and which is moreover laid down as a component of the right to good administration by Article 41(1) of the Charter (judgments of 11 April 2006, Angeletti v Commission, T-394/03, EU:T:2006:111, paragraph 162, and of 6 December 2012, Füller-Tomlinson v Parliament, T-390/10 P, EU:T:2012:652, paragraph 115).

153 In the particular field of the recovery of overpayments provided for in Article 85 of the Staff Regulations, time is therefore only one factor to be taken into account in determining whether the right to recovery was properly exercised, particularly in view, first, of the fact that the irregularity on the part of the administration was obvious and, second, of all the circumstances which may be taken into account, such as the amounts requested, the wrongful conduct of the administration, the good faith of the official and the care which he might normally be expected to exercise in the light of his training, his grade and his professional experience (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 February 1994, White v Commission, T-107/92, EU:T:1994:17, paragraph 47, and of 5 November 2002, Ronsse v Commission, T-205/01, EU:T:2002:269, paragraph 52).

154 Lastly, failure to comply with the reasonable time requirement does not, as a general rule, justify annulment of a decision taken at the end of an administrative procedure. Indeed, it is only where the undue delay is likely to have an effect on the actual substance of the decision adopted at the end of the administrative procedure or to affect the ability of the persons concerned to defend themselves effectively that the breach of the reasonable time principle affects the validity of the administrative procedure (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 October 2017, Lucaccioni v Commission, T-551/16, not published, EU:T:2017:751, paragraph 94 and the case-law cited, and of 13 July 2018, Curto v Parliament, T-275/17, EU:T:2018:479, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited).

155 Thus, it is necessary to determine whether the recovery procedure was conducted by the Commission with the requisite diligence.

156 In that context, a distinction should be drawn between two periods, namely on the one hand, the period from 25 July 2019 (when the applicant informed the PMO that he was going to establish his residence in Sweden; see paragraph 5 above) to 19 February 2022 (when the PMO informed the applicant of the recovery of the sums overpaid in terms of the weighting factor for Sweden and the resettlement allowance; see paragraph 18 above) and, on the other hand, the period from 19 February 2022 to 8 May 2024 (date of adoption of the third contested decision; see paragraph 36 above).

157 In the present case, it should be noted that, as regards the first period, the applicant brought actions before the Swedish courts, which, as the Commission submits, had a direct impact on the present case and thus contributed to the length of the procedure. The Commission cannot be criticised for having waited until the conclusion of the proceedings at national level before initiating the recovery procedure at issue, since, in so doing, it left open the possibility of revising its position should those proceedings ultimately result in an outcome favourable to the applicant.

158 Furthermore, as regards the second period, it should be noted that that period lasted for more than two years. A number of circumstances contributed to the lengthening of the recovery procedure in the present case, such as the applicant’s initial opposition to repayment of the sums which he had received, the fact that various recovery decisions were annulled on the basis of concerns relating, inter alia, to respect for the right to be heard, the numerous complaints lodged by the applicant and the fact that he adduced new evidence of his residence in Sweden.

159 In those circumstances, the length of the recovery procedure cannot be regarded as unreasonable, within the meaning of Article 41(1) of the Charter.

160 Lastly, as regards the failure to comply with the four-month time limit for deciding on the complaint lodged by the applicant on 14 March 2024 against the first contested decision (see paragraph 33 above), it should be noted that the Commission did in fact adopt the decision rejecting the complaints after the expiry of that period, namely on 14 October 2024. However, it is clear that the applicant has adduced no evidence to support the conclusion that, had it not been for that irregularity, the outcome of the procedure might have been different, with the result that the applicant’s argument that that period was exceeded must be rejected.

161 In the light of the foregoing, the second part of the third plea in law must be rejected.

– The third part of the third plea in law, alleging breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials

162 The applicant submits that the administration committed a service-related fault and acted negligently towards him, in so far as the Commission failed to take account of his interests before adopting the first contested decision and implementing it.

163 In the course of the exchanges between the parties, the applicant stated that the implementation of that decision could seriously harm his financial situation and therefore invited the PMO to suspend the recovery of the amounts allegedly undue. In that context, he explained, inter alia, that he had to repay mortgage loans in Belgium and Sweden and that he had to bear significant monthly expenditure on his properties in those two countries.

164 Furthermore, the applicant states that he is 70 years old, with the result that the passage of time and delays have had particular implications for him. The applicant claims that in the decision rejecting the complaints, the Commission did not address that argument, again showing that it was not concerned about his interests and current difficulties.

165 Lastly, the Commission stated in the decision rejecting the complaints that, if the applicant were successful before the national courts or before the Court of Justice, or if the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers decided to bring infringement proceedings against Sweden and the Court of Justice were to find that Sweden had failed to fulfil its obligations, it could then re-examine the applicant’s case. In the applicant’s view, in so doing, the Commission placed him in a state of anxiety and considerable uncertainty.

166 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

167 In that regard, it should be recalled that the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials, which stems from the principle of good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter, implies in particular that, when the competent authority takes a decision concerning the situation of an official, it should take into consideration all the factors which may affect its decision and that, in so doing, it should take into account not only the interests of the service but also those of the official concerned (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 December 2019, Wehrheim v ECB, T-100/18, not published, EU:T:2019:882, paragraph 87 and the case-law cited, and of 6 October 2021, AV and AW v Parliament, T-43/20, not published, EU:T:2021:666, paragraph 79).

168 In the present case, in the first place, it must be stated that the applicant’s claims relating to his advanced age and the fact that he had to repay two mortgage loans in Belgium and Sweden, as well as to bear significant monthly expenditure for his property in Sweden and his house in Belgium, cannot succeed.

169 The duty to have regard for the welfare of officials cannot, under any circumstances, compel the administration to give a European Union provision an effect which would go against the clear and precise terms of that provision. Accordingly, an applicant cannot rely on the administration’s duty to have regard for the welfare of officials in order to obtain advantages which the Staff Regulations do not allow him or her to be granted (see judgment of 16 May 2007, F v Commission, T-324/04, EU:T:2007:140, paragraph 169 and the case-law cited). It follows that, since the applicant has not proved that he satisfied the conditions required by the Staff Regulations for entitlement to the resettlement allowance and the weighting factor for Sweden (see paragraph 83 above), he cannot rely on the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials in order to receive payments to which he is not entitled under the Staff Regulations.

170 In the second place, it is also necessary to reject the applicant’s claim that the Commission placed him in a state of anxiety and considerable uncertainty by stating in the decision rejecting the complaints that it would be in a position to re-examine the case should he succeed before the national courts or before the Court of Justice. It must be stated that, by referring to such a possibility, the Commission took account of his interests, since it thereby left open the possibility of revising its position should the proceedings initiated by the applicant against the Swedish authorities ultimately result in an outcome favourable to him.

171 In the light of the foregoing, the third part of the third plea in law must be rejected.

– The fourth part of the third plea in law, alleging infringement of the right to be heard

172 The applicant claims that he did not have a real opportunity to submit his observations before the adoption of the first contested decision.

173 In that regard, the applicant claims that, in order for that right to be respected, the administration must first inform the official or member of staff concerned of its intention to adopt an act liable to affect him or her adversely, and states also that, before adopting such a decision, it is to invite him or her to submit his or her observations, a process which, however, was not followed by the Commission in the present case. In that context, the applicant states that the first contested decision already referred to the possibility for him to submit a complaint within the meaning of Article 90 of the Staff Regulations. Accordingly, that decision was final, irrespective of his observations.

174 The applicant concludes that, had the Commission allowed him to submit his observations, it might have adopted a different decision, perhaps less prejudicial to him, with the result that the first contested decision must be regarded as unlawful.

175 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

176 In that regard, it should be recalled that the right to be heard in all proceedings, laid down in Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter, which is inherent in respect of the rights of the defence, guarantees every person the opportunity to make known his or her views effectively during an administrative procedure and before the adoption of any decision liable to affect his or her interests adversely (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 December 2014, Boudjlida, C-249/13, EU:C:2014:2431, paragraphs 34 and 36).

177 More specifically, the right to be heard requires that the person concerned be given an opportunity in advance, in the context of a written or oral exchange initiated by the administration, to make his or her views known about the matters which might be held against him or her in the measure to be taken (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 November 2022, QM v Europol, T-164/21, EU:T:2022:695, paragraph 57 (not published) and the case-law cited).

178 Furthermore, it should be stated that an infringement of the right to be heard results in the annulment of the decision adopted at the end of the administrative procedure at issue only if, had it not been for that irregularity, the outcome of the procedure might have been different (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 January 2019, RY v Commission, T-160/17, EU:T:2019:1, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).

179 In the present case, it should be noted that, contrary to the requirements established by the case-law cited in paragraphs 176 and 177 above, the Commission did not invite the applicant to submit, either in writing or orally, his observations or any further explanations, prior to the adoption of the first contested decision.

180 It follows that, in the present case, the Commission did not respect the applicant’s right to be heard within the meaning of Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter.

181 However, it must also be observed that, prior to the adoption of the first contested decision, the applicant was, during the procedure, given the opportunity to discuss the grounds on which the Commission relied. In particular, in his observations of 23 December 2022 and in his complaint of 16 March 2023, the applicant raised arguments similar to those put forward in his complaint against that decision (see paragraph 33 above). Thus, in his observations of 23 December 2022 and in his complaint of 16 March 2023, the applicant already claimed, in essence, that the Commission had erred and failed to observe the principle of the autonomous interpretation of EU law, by relying on the allegedly erroneous decisions of the Swedish national courts which refused to grant him a certificate of residence.

182 In that context, it is clear that the applicant has not demonstrated that, had he been given the opportunity to exercise his right to be heard before the adoption of the first contested decision, he would have submitted arguments other than those relied on in his observations of 23 December 2022 and in his complaint of 16 March 2023, of which the Commission was aware when that decision was adopted. Consequently, the applicant has not adduced any evidence to support the conclusion that, had it not been for that irregularity, the procedure might, as regards the first contested decision, have led to a different outcome, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 178 above.

183 In the light of all the foregoing, the fourth part of the third plea in law must be rejected and, accordingly, the claim for annulment must be rejected in its entirety.

Claim for damages

184 The applicant argues that, by adopting the first contested decision, the Commission infringed several rules of law and fundamental rights, with the result that that decision should be annulled. In his view, that decision also caused him material and non-material damage.

185 First, as regards material damage, the applicant argues that the PMO deducted sums from his pension, even though he was entitled to receive the resettlement allowance and the weighting factor, with the result that he is justified in claiming repayment of the sums wrongly deducted from his pension together with default interest. Accordingly, in his view, at the time when the action was brought, the material damage amounted to EUR 10 697.19, excluding default interest, whereas the total amount to be recovered amounted to EUR 12 935.26 in accordance with the schedule provided.

186 Second, as regards non-material damage, the applicant considers that the very particular circumstances of the present case – namely the fact that the dispute lasted for more than two years due to the lack of communication or differences of opinion between the Commission departments as to his situation, that he was systematically required to submit complaints in order to challenge the PMO’s decisions, which the Commission upheld, the Commission’s lack of consideration for his difficult situation and his age, and the fact that he never received any support or response from the Commission when he informed it that the Swedish authorities had refused to register him in the population register and that the national courts had not ruled in his favour – were sources of considerable anxiety and uncertainty for him. In the applicant’s view, the non-material damage could therefore reasonably be assessed ex aequo et bono at EUR 10 000.

187 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

188 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the European Union may incur non-contractual liability only if a number of conditions are fulfilled, namely: (i) the institution’s conduct must be unlawful, (ii) actual damage must have been suffered, and (iii) there must be a causal link between the institution’s conduct and the damage alleged. It is sufficient that any one of those conditions is not satisfied for the action for damages to have to be dismissed in its entirety, without there being any need for examination of the other conditions (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 December 2019, Wehrheim v ECB, T-100/18, not published, EU:T:2019:882, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

189 Furthermore, it is apparent from settled case-law in civil service matters that, where a claim for compensation is closely related to an application for annulment, the rejection of the latter, either as inadmissible or as unfounded, also results in the rejection of the claim for compensation (see judgment of 30 September 2003, Martínez Valls v Parliament, T-214/02, EU:T:2003:254, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

190 In the present case, it should be noted that the claim for damages is closely linked to the claim for annulment, in so far as the alleged damage originates in the contested decisions and in the decision rejecting the complaints. In so far as the claim for annulment has been rejected, the claim for compensation relating to that damage must also be rejected.

191 In any event, in so far as any alleged damage is not linked to those decisions, it should be pointed out that the applicant has neither specified nor demonstrated the existence of unlawful conduct which caused the damage, thus failing to discharge the burden of proving the unlawfulness of the conduct alleged against the institution and the existence of a causal link between the conduct and the damage alleged, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 188 above.

192 In the light of the foregoing, the claim for damages must be rejected and, therefore, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

Costs

193 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

194 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Commission, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)

hereby:

1. Declares that there is no longer any need to adjudicate on the claims seeking the annulment of the decision of 27 March 2024, which, in the first place, confirmed the recovery of the sum concerned under Article 85 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union by providing him with a repayment schedule, and, in the second place, specified that the suspension of deductions was not provided for by the Staff Regulations, and the decision of 8 May 2024 confirming the recovery of the sum under Article 85 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, while amending the repayment schedule and specifying that the suspension of deductions is not provided for by the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union;

2. Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

3. Orders GW to pay the costs.

Kalėda

Jaeger

Verschuur

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 3 June 2026.

V. Di Bucci

M. van der Woude

Registrar

President

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* Language of the case: English.